

Message Text

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ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /025 W
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R 021250Z JUN 75
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4747
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 3674

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, US, XF
SUBJ: CODEL DU PONT: SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATIONS ON ARMS
AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. SUMMARY. MEETINGS WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN CENTERED ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND ISSUES. RIFAI TALKED OF JORDAN'S VIEW OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO THE GULF: THEY SHOULD CONTINUE. HE COVERED JORDAN'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS, THE NEED FOR AIR DEFENSE, IMPROVING JORDAN RELATIONS WITH SYRIA BUT THE ABSENCE OF ANY JOINT MILITARY COMMAND, AND IMPROVING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. LOOKING TO THE FUTRE, RIFAI STRESSED JORDAN'S BELIEF THAT ANOTHER STEP WITH EGYPT, FOLLOWED BY SYRIA, WAS THE BEST BET FOR PROGRESS. KING HUSSEIN NOTED JORDAN WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT ARMS BUILD-UP IN THE GULF, AND SAW IRAN, IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA MEETING TOGETHER ON A JOINT DEFENSE AND NON-INTERFRERENCE PACT FOR THE AREA TOGETHER WITH THE SMALLER STATES. KING ALSO INDICATED HE WOULD ALSO BE VISITING SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR AND LATER WOULD GO TO OMAN. HE REPEATED IN SOMEWHAT MORE MUTED FORM HIS CONCERN ABOUT BRITISH FOOT-DRAGGING IN OMAN. END SUMMARY.

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2. CONGRESSMAN AND MRS. PIERRE DUP PONT, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. ALISON BRENNER OF HIRC, VISITED JORDAN FROM EVENING MAY 31 THROUGH MID-

AFTERNOON JUNE 1. THE CONGRESSMAN HELD SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS JUNE 1 WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, PRIME MINISTER RIFAI AND KING HUSSEIN. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS COVER MAJOR POINTS IN CONVERSATIONS. IT HAS NOT BEEN SEEN BY CONGRESSMAN DU PONT AND EMBASSY AMMAN WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF EMBASSY TEL AVIV WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH COPY. IT IS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO CONGRESSMAN DU PONT'S COMMENTS AND CORRECTIONS.

3. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN--MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO GENERAL EXPLANATION BY CROWN PRINCE OF JORDAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE. CONGRESSMAN DU PONT ASKED FOR HASSAN'S GENERAL APPRECIATION OF JORDAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND WHAT FUTURE MIGHT BE. HASSAN OUTLINED IN FAMILIAR TERMS MAJOR AREAS OF EMPHASIS. HE DESCRIBED "RIFT VALLEY" PACKAGE, SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS SUCH AS MINERALS, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTIVE SECTOR (INDUSTRY). HE DESCRIBED IBRD ROLE COMMENCING WITH MCNAMARA VISIT LAST YEAR AND HOPED THAT BY EARLY FALL HE WILL BE IN A POSITION BOTH TO VISIT U.S. AND ALSO TO COORDINATE WITH IBRD ON NEXT FIVE-YEAR PLAN. HASSAN DISCUSSED HIS HOPE THAT U.S. MIGHT INCREASE SUPPORT FOR JORDAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EITHER DIRECTLY, OF IF ADDITIONAL BILATERAL SUPPORT WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT, THEN THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS TO IBRD OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATION. CONGRESSMAN DU PONT INDICATED HE HAD A CONTINUING INTEREST IN JORDANIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INVITED HASSAN TO BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM WHEN HE COMES TO THE U.S., AND OFFERED TO BRING TOGETHER FOR CROWN PRINCE'S VISIT SMALL GROUP OF INTERESTED U.S. CONGRESSMEN TO DISCUSS WITH HIM IN SOME DETAIL JORDANIAN DEVELOPMENT.

4. PRIME MINISTER RIFAI--DISCUSSION CENTERED ON MILITARY AND THEN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. CONGRESSMAN DU PONT OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD BEEN REVIEWING U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY IN THE GULF. HE ASKED RIFAI FOR ANY IDEAS HE MIGHT WISH TO OFFER ON THE SUBJECT. RIFAI REPLIED THAT
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MOST OF THE GULF STATES WERE RELATIVELY SMALL AND COULD NOT SUPPORT MUCH OF AN ARMED FORCE. THEY WERE LAGGING BEHIND BOTH IN TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT. HE FELT THAT IT WAS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM FOR THEM AND IN THE INTEREST OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES CONCERNED, THE U.S. SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT BEING OVERLY RESTRICTIVE IN ARMS SALES. THE ARMS WOULD PROBABLY NEVER BE EFFECTIVELY USED; THEY WERE LOOKED ON AS SYMBOLS OF INDEPENDENCE. OTHER STATES IN EUROPE AND PERHAPS THE SOVIETS WOULD WILLINGLY SELL IF THE U.S. REFUSED TO DO SO.

5. RIFAI CONTINUED THAT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT JORDAN FACED SOME SIMILAR PROBLEMS. JORDAN HAD A RELATIVELY SMALL ARMY IN COMPARISON TO ITS NEIGHBORS ALTHOUGH IT WAS WELL TRAINED AND USED TO BE WELL EQUIPPED. NOW IT WAS LAGGING WELL BEHIND ITS NEIGHBORS WHO HAD BEEN INUNDATED WITH NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT EITHER FROM THE U.S. IN THE CASE OF ISRAEL OR FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE CASE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA. U.S. HAD ALSO PROVIDED BARELY ENOUGH TO KEEP UP MINIMUM EFFICIENCY WITH NOT MUCH TO SPARE, AND NOW EVEN SOME OF THAT WAS FOREIGN MILITARY SALES WHICH REQUIRED JORDAN TO SEEK SAUDI OR GULF STATE SUPPORT SINCE IT COULD NOT PAY FMS CREDITS ON ITS OWN.

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /025 W

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R 021250Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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6. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE CONGRESS FOR \$130 MILLION. \$100 MILLION OF WHICH WAS GRANT. THIS HAD BEEN CUT BY THE CONGRESS TO \$60 MILLION. LAST YEAR'S GRANT WAS ONLY \$40 MILLION SO THE NET INCREASE IN GRANT AID WAS ONLY \$20 MILLION. THIS WOULD ALSO BE EATEN UP BY THE TANKS AND ARTILLERY WHICH JORDAN REQUIRES. JORDAN HAS NO EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE, ONLY A FEW OLD SELF-PROPELLED 40 MM GUNS. JORDAN WAS PREPARED TO TURN TO THE OTHER ARABS FOR AIR DEFENSE. IN THE LONG RUN THE U.S. SHOULD KNOW THAT MODERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS A LUXURY THAT COULD ONLY BE SUPPORTED BY STRENGTH.

7. THE JORDANIAN OUTLOOK WAS NOT SOLELY DICTATED BY THE ISRAELI MILITARY POSITION--JORDAN KNEW THAT IT COULD NEVER EFFECTIVELY BALANCE ISRAELI MILITARY STRENGTH. SYRIA AND IRAQ WERE IMPORTANT PRODEMS AND JORDAN REQUIRED DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO MAINTAIN ITS MODERATION IN REGARD TO THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES.

8. TURNING TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, RIFAI SAID THAT THINGS WERE MORE COMPLEX. HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN. JORDAN WAS VERY HAPPY WITH THE U.S. PEACE INITIATIVES. IT WANTED A DISENGAGEMENT OF ITS OWN AND DR. KISSINGER STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS.
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ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY REASONABLE PROPOSAL. THE ISRAELIS WERE TOLD THAT UNLESS SOMETHING HAPPENED TO PRE-EMPT THE RABAT CONFERENCE, JORDAN COULD NOT CONTINUE AS A NEGOTIATING PARTNER. HOWEVER NOTHING HAPPENED AND THE ARABS MADE THE PALESTINIANS (PLO) SOLELY RESPONSIBLE. THE JORDANIANS AT RABAT COULD NOT ARGUE THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED ANYTHING. JORDAN THEREFORE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE OTHER ARABS.

9. NOW JORDAN IS IN A MORE COMFORTABLE POSITION THAN EVER BEFORE WITH THE ARAB WORLD. THERE ARE NO REAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH ITS FELLOW ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO. IN THAT SENSE FOR JORDAN RABAT WAS A BLESSING IN DISGUISE, BUT IT WAS A REAL BLOW TO THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE BECAUSE THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE PLO SEEMS ABSOLUTELY TO HAVE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS. JORDAN IS DEEPLY SADDENED BY ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE WHICH IT SEES AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE SECRETARY'S LAST ROUND OF TALKS.

10. JORDAN NOW SUPPORTS SOME CONTINUATION OF THE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. IT MAY NOT BE IDEAL, BUT IT COMES CLOSEST TO DOING WHAT IS POSSIBLE. JORDAN BELIEVES MOMENTUM MUST BE KEPT GOING. IT HOPES FOR A POSITIVE DECISION FROM THE REASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY WHICH WILL RESULT IN AN INITIATIVE TO START TALKS GOING AGAIN WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND THEN SIMILARLY WITH THE SYRIANS WHICH THE JORDANIANS RECOGNIZE IS LIKELY TO BE MORE DIFFICULT.

1. THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON THE WEST BANK. WOULD JORDAN ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE THERE? RIFAI SAID THIS IS A

DIFFICULT QUESTION. THE ISRAELIS HAVE REFUSED
THE PLO AND NOW INSIST ON NEGOTIATING WITH JORDAN.
BUT JORDAN CANNOT DO THIS UNLESS AN ARAB SUMMIT
REVERSES ITS DECISION. WHILE THIS MIGHT HAPPEN,
IT WOULD TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AND THE IMPORTANT
POINT IS THAT MOMENTUM IS NEEDED TO KEEP THE AREA FROM
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COMING BACK TO CONFLICT. WE ARE REALLY AT A CROSS-
ROADS. NO DECISION IN FACT MAKES WAR INEVITABLE
WHICH WILL ONLY BRING SENSELESS DESTRUCTION TO
EVERYONE. EUROPE AND THE U.S. WILL BE DRAWN IN,
AN OIL EMBARGO IS LIKELY TO BE IMPOSED, AND
EVENTUALLY THERE WILL BE CONFRONTATION AGAIN WITH THE
SOVIETS. THE WHOLE PROBLEM BECOMES A VICIOUS
CIRCLE OF DESTRUCTION. SIMILARLY, THE STATE OF NO
WAR OR NO PEACE FOR JORDAN IS EQUIVALENT TO A DRIFT
TOWARD WAR. BUT THAT SEEMS TO BE THE ISRAELI STRATEGY--
TO DIG IN AND WAIT FOR THE 1976 ELECTIONS IN THE U.S.
AND HOPE FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. BUT
THIS IS A MOST SERIOUS AND DANGEROUS COURSE.
THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT WAIT WITHOUT ANYTHING HAPPENDING.

12. ON GENEVA, JORDAN CANNOT BE VERY OPTIMISTIC.
THE CONFERENCE WOULD ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY BE PLUNGED
INTO CONTROVERSY ON PLO REPRESENTATION. IF ISRAEL
REFUSED TO ATTEND OVER THAT ISSUE, WE WOULD HAVE
NO CONFERENCE. IF GENEVA WERE TO FAIL,
THERE WOULD BE NO PLACE ELSE TO GO.

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13. CONGRESSMAN DU PONT ASKED RIFAI FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE PLO. WOULD THEY COME TO GENEVA OR REFUSE? RIFAI SAID THE PLO WOULD HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTY DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM. IT WAS A COLLECTION OF ORGANIZATIONS AND THEREFORE A COLLECTION OF CONTRADICTIONS. THE PLO WAS OPERATING WITH GREAT ILLUSIONS. THE PLO WANTS ITS OWN STATE BUT IS NOT READY TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. IT WANTS THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW, BUT IT IS NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE. IT HOPES TO AVOID DISCUSSION AND IT HAS NOTHING TO OFFER. IF FACED WITH A NECESSITY TO DECIDE ON NEGOTIATION, PERHAPS PLO MIGHT EVENTUALLY SPLIT BETWEEN THE REJECTIONISTS AND THE MODERATES.

14. THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED WHAT THE MINIMUM ARAB POSITION WOULD BE ON THE WEST BANK. RIFAI SAID THIS IS HARD TO DEFINE, BUT THERE IS A LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR OF ARAB OPINION WHICH REQUIRES ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM. THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED IF THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM COULD BE SEPARATED. RIFAI SAID NO IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THE ISSUES AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE--THE ARABS WILL NOT AGREE TO GIVE UP THE RETURN OF ARAB SOVEREIGNTY
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TO THE AREAS OF JERUSALEM FORMERLY UNDER ARAB CONTROL. HE REAFFIRMED FOR THE CONGRESSMAN THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT TAKE PLACE SHORT OF RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE JERUSALEM LAST IF THE OTHER QUESTIONS HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. THERE WOULD BE NO SETTLEMENT WITHOUT JERUSALEM BEING RESOLVED, ONLY AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, BUT THERE COULD BE LOTS OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESOLVING JERUSALEM, INCLUDING AN OPEN CITY JOINTLY RUN WITH FREE ACCESS TO ALL THE RELIGIOUS PLACES. DR. BRENNER ASKED IF INTERNATIONALIZATION WAS POSSIBLE. RIFAI SAID NO, THAT IS ONE POINT ABOUT JERUSALEM ON WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE.

15. CONGRESSMAN DU PONT ASKED ABOUT RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND IRAQ. RIFAI REPLIED THAT RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE GOOD NOW. IN THE PAST THEY HAD FOLLOWED A CERTAIN

ZIG-ZAG PATTERN. THEY WERE AT ROCK BOTTOM BETWEEN 1969 AND 1970. NOW THERE ARE CONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND THERE IS POLITICAL COORDINATION. ASDA IS A MODERATE AND REASONABLE PERSON ALTHOUGH THERE ARE CERTAINLY SOME EXTREMISTS AROUND HIM. HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HE THOUGHT JORDAN MAY HAVE HAD SOME INFLUENCE WITH ASDA ON THE UN MANDATE. KING HUSSEIN HAD SENT ASAD A MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT. AS FOR MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND JOINT COMMANDS, THIS WAS NOT TRUE. IT WAS JUST ISRAELI PROPAGANDA. THERE WAS MILITARY COORDINATION WHICH COVERED DEFENSE ON BOTH FRONTS AND PARTICULARLY ON THE WEAK JORDANIAN FLANK AND SUCH COORDINATION PLANNING WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY IF THERE WERE AN ATTACK. AS FOR INFILTRATION, FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY HAD SLACKENED AND THERE HAD BEEN NO EFFORTS TO CROSS THE SYRIAN BORDER FOR THE LAST SIX WEEKS.

16. WITH IRAQ, RELATIONS WERE ALSO IMPROVING, BUT NOT NEARLY AS RAPIDLY AS WITH SYRIA. THEY HAVE EXCHANGED SOME DELEGATIONS AND HAVE BROKEN THE ICE WITH AN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT FOR IRAQI USE OF THE PORT OF AQABA. BECAUSE OF THE BAD RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, IRAQ FINDS IT CONVENIENT TO TRANS-SHIP GOODS THROUGH JORDAN RATHER THAN THROUGH SYRIA. CONFIDENTIAL

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THERE WILL BE, JORDAN HOPES, SOME ECONOMIC AID AND LOANS FROM IRAQ. A DELEGATION IS EXPECTED IN TEN DAYS FOR DISCUSSION OF DETAILS. JORDAN PLAYED, IT HOPED, AN HELPFUL ROLE IN SOLVING THE IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE.

17. TURNING TO THE GULF, THE CONGRESSMAN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE SIZE AND THE ESPECIALLY THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE WEAPONS IN THE U.S. ARMS SALES PROGRAM. IT AMOUNTED TO NEARLY \$4 BILLION A YEAR AND RAISED SOME LONG-RANGE QUESTIONS. DID JORDAN HAVE SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE ROLE OF IRAN IN THE AREA? RIFAI REPLIED THAT JORDAN ENJOYED EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THEY THOUGHT THE SHAH WISHED TO REACH SOME AGREEMENT ABOUT MUTUAL DEFENSE IN THE GULF WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE FOREIGN POWERS. IT WAS LIKELY THAT IRAN, IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD GET TOGETHER WITH THE SMALLER STATES AND WORK OUT SOME ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SHAH AS THE STRATEGIC PROTECTOR OF THE REGION. IRAN WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THIS COORDINATION WOULD FORM A VERY SOLID BASE. IRAN SEEMED TO BE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THREATS FROM THE EAST, FROM INDIA AND CHINA TO THE AREA.

18. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO JORDAN'S SPECIFIC AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. RIFAI EMPHASIZED THAT JORDAN AIR DEFENSE WAS ESSENTIALLY AT ZERO LEVEL. THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT WAS REAL AND THERE WERE ALSO ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR JORDAN IN NOT HAVING AN ADEQUATE AIR DEFENSE. ISRAEL HAS AN OVERWHELMING AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY, AND SO DOES SYRIA AND IRAQ THROUGH SOVIET SAMs. THE PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE U.S. AS LONG AS ONE YEAR AGO AND LATER DURING KING'S LAST TRIP TO WASHINGTON WHEN AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON DETAILS. THE KING WILL GO TO SAUDI ARABIA ON TUESDAY, JUNE 3, TO SEEK FINANCING. THIS WILL BE OUTSIDE THE U.S. MILITARY AID PROGRAM WHICH WILL BE DEVOTED MAINLY TO BUYING F-5E'S, TANKS AND ARTILLERY. THE CONGRESSMAN MENTIONED THAT HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE AID PROGRAM FOR JORDAN ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME CONFIDENTIAL

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UNEASINESS ON THE HILL ON ALL WEAPONS-RELATED ACTIVITY. NEVERTHELESS JORDAN HAS ENJOYED BROAD CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. RIFAI REPEATED THAT CTUS THIS YEAR HAD TAKEN THE \$130 MILLION PROGRAM DOWN TO A POSITION WHERE IT REPRESENTED ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF WHAT JORDAN ACTUALLY NEEDED AND THAT LONG LEAD TIMES AND INCREASING COSTS WERE GRADUALLY REDUCING WHAT JORDAN COULD BUY FOR THE MONEY. THE MEETING CLOSED WITH CONGRESSMAN DU PONT EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S DETAILED EXPLANATIONS.

19. KING HUSSEIN--AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED THE KING ABOUT HIS VIEW OF OUR ARMS SALES PROGRAM IN THE GULF. THE KING INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT PAY TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING AS JORDAN WAS SOMEWHAT REMOVED FROM THE AREA, BUT THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE WHAT OTHERS WISHED TO HAVE AND MAKE NO MAJOR CHANGES IN OUR EFFORT. THE KING CONTINUED BY NOTING THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOW, IN HIS VIEW, IN A VERY STABLE AND COOPERATIVE POSTURE. THERE HAD BEEN POTENTIAL FOR DIFFICULTY, BUT THE SUCCESSION HAD TAKEN PLACE SMOOTHLY, AND THERE WERE EXCELLENT REASONS TO BE VERY CONFIDENT ABOUT CONDITIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /025 W

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R 021250Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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20. IRAQ AND IRAN WERE IN A BETTER POSTURE AND HE EXPECTED SOON ALL THE STATES AROUND THE GULF WOULD MEET TO ROGANIZE AN AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND JOINT DEFENSE FROM THE OUTSIDE. SOUTH YEMEN WAS SERIOUS PROBLEM AND ALSO WAS INTERFERING IN OMAN. THE SITUATION IN THAT PART OF THE THE AREA WAS NOT VERY STABLE. THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED ABOUT JORDAN'S ACTIVITIES IN OMAN. THE KING REPLIED THAT SOME SMALL MILITARY UNITS HAD GONE. HE REMAINED CONCERNED THAT WHILE IT WAS NOT BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY, SOME OF THE BRITISH CONTRACT PEOPLE SEEMED TO WANT TO PROLONG THE WAR FOR PERSONAL PROFIT AND TO AVOID CASUALTIES. THE SULTAN HAS NO REAL INFRA-STRUCTURE BUT IS TRYING VERY HARD AND THERE IS A NEED FOR SOME COORDINATED ACTION TO WIND UP THE CONFLICT.

21. JORDAN WAS ALSO TYRING TO HELP IN NORTH YEMEN. THIS IN LARGE PART DEPENDED UPON WHAT THE SAUDIS WOULD DO AND HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE POSITIVE. HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT SOUTH YEMEN, WHEN EVENTS IN SOMALIA AND ERITREA SEEMED TO BE SLIPPING TOWARD THE COMMUNIST POSITION. THE KING REPEATED HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT EH INTRODUCTION OF U.S.ARMS IN THE AREA ALTHOUGH HE DID HAVE SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE ABILITY TO USE THEM EFFECTIVELY. IN THE SAUDI ARMY

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HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS SEEMED TO BE
APPOINTED WITHOUT MUCH TRAINING. YOUNGER OFFICERS
SEEMED TO RESENT THIS AND IT WAS THE SOURCE OF
POSSIBLE UNHAPPINESS WHICH COULD POSSIBLY LEAD TO FURTHER TROUBLE.
JORDAN WAS BUILDING UP ITS CAPABILITY TO TRAIN FOREIGN
STUDENTS AND MANY FROM THE GULF AND SAUDI ARABIA
ARE TRAINING IN JORDAN.

22. THE CONGRESSMAN TURNED TO POLITICAL ISSUES
AND NOTED THAT THE KING HAD BEEN IN A VERY SOMBER
MOOD DURING HIS WASHINGTON TRIP AND ASKED IF IT HAD IMPROVED. THE
KING SAID HE FEELS ABOUT THE SAME AS HE DID THEN.
HE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FORD-SADAT
MEETINGS AND FELT THAT IF THERE IS NO FORWARD PROGRESS
THEN CONFLICT WILL COME AND THE RESULTS WILL BE DIFFICULT
TO PREDICT. EGYPT BADLY NEEDS ANOTHER STEP AND THAT
SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS.
THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE THE LAST TIME AS A
RESULT OF DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND JORDAN
WAS LOOKING TO THE U.S. TO SEE WHAT IT COULD DO.
CONGRESSMAN DU PONT SAID THAT THE U.S. LOOKED TO
HIS MAJESTY TO PURSUE A MODERATE POLICY AND WAS
EXTREMELY GRATIFIED THIS REMAINED THE KING'S POSITION
AND WE ALSO DEPENDED UPON HIS MAJESTY'S ADVICE
IN OTHER AREAS AND ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS ANYTHING HE
WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE TO PASS ON. THE KING MENTIONED
THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA AND TO QATAR
NEXT WEEK AND WOULD PASS ON HIS REACTIONS TO THE
SECRETARY. HE WILL GO TO OMAN LATER AND EXPECTS TO
SEE ALL THE TROOPS: JORDANIAN, IRANIAN,
BRITISH AND THE SULTAN'S ARMED FORCES AND TO REVIEW THE
SULTAN'S PLANS IN DETAIL. HE WOULD CERTAINLY LET
US KNOW WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE. THE CONGRESSMAN
MENTIONED THAT HE HOPED THE CONFLICT WOULD BE
RESOLVED SHORTLY AND BEFORE IT GOT BIGGER. HE SAID HE WAS
SORRY THAT IT COULD NOT BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE CANAL OPENED.
ADEN WOULD BECOME OF MORE IMPORTANCE AS CANAL TRAFFIC PICKED UP.

23. THE KING DISCUSSED BRIEFLY HIS CONCERN ABOUT
LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN ARABIAN PENINSULA.
"THEY ARE DOING AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF FOOLING AROUND
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IN THE AREA." HE STRESSED THAT JORDAN HOPED TO AVOID
ALIGNING ITSELF WITH GROUPINGS IN THE ARAB WORLD.
THE CONGRESSMAN REVIEWED WITH KING SOME OF HIS
CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF DEFENSE
ISSUES AND EXPRESSED HIS OWN CONCERN THAT IRAN AND
SAUDI ARABIA WERE FACING ENORMOUS PROBLEMS IN THE
RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH OIL

REVENUES. MANPOWER WAS SHORT AND HE WAS CONCERNED
THAT THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
WOULD NOT STAND THE PACE AND THE IMPACT OF THEIR
DEVELOPMENT. THE CONGRESSMAN SAID HE HOPED THE KING
WOULD SOON VISIT WASHINGTON AGAIN AND WOULD LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING HIM THERE AND PERHAPS TO GETTING
A SMALL GROUP OF INTERESTED MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE TOGETHER
TO MEET WITH THE KING.
PICKERING

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS, VISITS, MEETINGS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, MILITARY SALES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975AMMAN03674
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750192-0142
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750688/aaaadcdk.tel
Line Count: 556
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION H
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
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Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 JUN 2003
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EO Systematic Review
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